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Transparent technologies of voting

The certificate sample, the form of the code results publication, the form of address list publication and clarifications how to control the choice made with the certificate.

THE METHOD OF SECRET VOTE

Below is an overview of the method, while details could be found in a patent description, patent application # PCT /RU2007 /000500, patent RU 2345576.

After that the screen shows the list of nominees for the voter to choose from and vote for.

The printing device then prints out a document for the voter that we call “voter certificate” or simply “certificate”. The differences between a ballot paper and a certificate are given below:

a) A voter keeps a certificate with himself/herself instead of casting it into a ballot box.

b) In front of the nominee names, the printing device inserts the identity codes of various voters into each line of the certificate. The line which is corresponding to the voter choice contains a code which is still visible on the screen. The other lines contain the different codes of the real voters who cast their votes earlier.

For example, if a voter got a code 2201 and took his/her vote for the Republican Party, his/her certificate would look as follows (in case a voter code is unique within a ballot district):

Democratic Party 0112

Republican Party 2201

Socialistic Party 0943

Green Party 1118

The numbers 0112, 0943 and 1118 are codes of unknown voters who voted for democratic, socialistic and green party candidates accordingly. Once the voter is given the certificate, he/she makes sure that his/her code 2201, which has been shown on the screen, corresponds to the second line of the certificate - Republican Party. After that the code disappears from the screen and a voter leaves the ballot station with the certificate.

It is then proposed to publish the code returns, so that a voter using his/her certificate could control both his/her vote and those of other unknown voters whose codes are indicated in the certificate. Each discrepancy should be proved by a document, corrected and, perhaps, compensated in cash to the voter that found a discrepancy. By showing the certificate with a discrepancy to any authority, a voter does not disclose his/her vote, because one cannot prove that the identity code in the line with a discrepancy belongs to him/her.

Thus a voter has a document to challenge the returns, if the data in his/her certificate are not completely the same as in officially published code returns. On the other hand, one cannot sell and buy votes with the certificate. It is impossible to define with this certificate the choice of the voter, because only original recipient knows his/her identity code. Therefore, the seller cannot prove how he/she voted. So it makes no sense to sell and buy votes. Our method is an opportunity to control one’s own vote for those who did not take a vote. For this purpose we propose to publish the list of voters who have cast their votes. It is better to combine them in terms of their addresses. This way guarantees anonymity for voters who have cast or have not cast their votes. If the quantity of the voters in one apartment is nil, or it is equal to the total quantity of the voters so the information on this address can not be published separately. It can demonstrate the choice of voters who took a vote or who didn’t take a vote. This address should be combined in the list with neighbor apartment. If the combined sum after two apartments is equal neither to nil nor the total quantity of the voters it can’t be defined who personally took a vote and who didn’t. There can be many combinations of addresses. It can be the quantity of the voters within the floor or within the entire house or few houses. The neighbors can get the information from each other easy and check the accuracy of the address list.

Since the total quantity of the voters must be equal to the quantity of the voters in the list of code returns then it can be checked after the returns are published. Nobody can then accuse either the election committee or the electronic system designers of falsifying votes.

If there is no centralized voting electronic system we propose to set up the simplex electronic local system while using “Retro-Control”. It may consist of the usual personal computers with printing devices. It is desirable to combine the computers in the Local Network but it is enough to use the portable device for the computer exchange. To follow the principle of secret ballot the monitor of the computer should be covered. There is an eyehole on the top of the pyramidal cover and it is the voter who can see the screen. The voter can make a choice with the help of the electronic pointing device for example the computer mouse. The rest is the same as described above.

If the voting is held at home and at the remote locations it is advisable to use portable computers instead of ballot box. The screen of such computer also should be hidden for example with curtains. If there is a portable printing device so the certificate is printed out automatically. If there is no device installed the certificate should be filled out by the member of the election committee manually. In this case the voter should memorize his/her code and press the button. After casting a ballot the code should be erased and the voter can see the image of his/her certificate with the lines to be filled out. Then the screen can be opened to everybody and all codes are written down from the certificate manually.

If there is no possibility to use the computers at a polling place (it is a very unusual situation nowadays) we propose to call it “voting counter”. It is the isolated cabin with “the cashier” inside – one of the members of the committee – the checker in other words. The voting counter is equipped with the observing eyehole. It is only the voter who can see the process of the voting which takes place inside the cabin. Instead of the computer mouse the choice is made with a pointing device for example the pointer available outside the voting counter. The cashier acts as a computer. He produces the code for the voter at random; collects the code returns; fills out the certificates manually and gives this paper through the sliding window.

The election returns can be published on the Internet and sent through mobile telecommunication system, by means of sms – short message service. It would be convenient for each voter to get the lists of the code returns with the address list from the district committee by regular mail, much the same as many people get a newspaper mailed to them.

The local press would list the election returns from each local district; the regional press would list the election returns of all districts; and the central press would list the election returns of a whole region (like a province or a state). It would then be easy to check if the returns were not counted correctly. Thus, each voter can buy three newspapers (local, central and regional) to make sure if:

1) the district election returns were included correctly into central ones;

2) the central election returns were included correctly into regional ones;

3) the regional election returns were included correctly into general returns. This process allows each voter can control every stage of elections.

As a conclusion let’s mark the advantages of our method.

1. As we proved before, this system more transparent and anonymous. It provides the freedom of choice and the secret ballot principle. It is the real advantage of the method. If the voters control the election returns the possibility of sporadic errors in counting and malicious falsification of the results are expelled. If few votes separate winners from losers, then with this system the loser party has to admit it or prove the opposite.

2. Besides the practical aspects there are moral and personal ones. The right and possibility to control your own vote is the development of civil rights and freedoms. It is valuable for each citizen. This moral value must be developed.

3. Socially significant advantages of the “Retro-control” system come when it is impossible to accuse or just suspect somebody of falsifying election returns. The legitimacy and authority of the new leader or the party elected are getting higher and social harmony becomes stronger.

4. A party or a person elected through the “Retro-control” method will be granted prestige on the international arena and the whole country will be considered as a developed country with a democratic election system.

5. Nowadays many designers of the electronic elections system have to make their inventions more transparent for control. Sometimes they have to tell the original codes of the software. It can be dangerous to rely on the honesty of the designers because many scholars believe the possibility of a coup d’etat exists. However the more transparent the system is the more possible this system can be exposed to the unauthorized break-in. The “Retro-control” method solves this problem drastically. When the voters can control their votes there is no need to control the electronic system work. Protecting the system from illegal break-in is the prerogative of the system designers. They get the responsibility to protect the system from illegal attack.

6. Using the eyehole gives the possibility to the watchers to control even the finger movements of the voter. An unfair voter can’t make a picture of his/her choice with a cell phone camera and sell his/her vote later.